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THE EAGLE AND THE DRAGON: A REVIEW OF COOL WAR: THE
FUTURE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION*
ANDREAS KUERSTEN**

I. INTRODUCTION
The image on the cover of Noah Feldman's latest bookl-a dragon rising below
a soaring eagle-is an apt representation of the rise of China in a world that has been
dominated by the United States since the end of the Cold War.2 The rapport between
these two countries will likely determine their courses and that of international law
and relations in general for decades to come. Will they interact more or less
cooperatively? Or will they slip into the chilled, zero sum, and vicious competition
that characterized the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship? In Cool War: The Future of
Global Competition ("Cool War"), Feldman presents a situation closer to the latter
scenario, along with predictions for how and where this contest will play out and
strategies for how relations can and should be managed under modem and evolving
international law and institutions.
In reviewing Feldman's book, it is important to place it within the scholarship
and debates taking place over the impact of the U.S.-China relationship on
international law, politics, and the international system generally. Feldman occupies
a position warning of coming conflict-though not necessarily military-in a
bipolar world. This view stands farther along the line of change from present
circumstances than those predicting continued U.S. dominance and a Chinese
collapse 3 or a more peaceful bipolar structure managed effectively by international
institutions. 4 Feldman does not, however, go so far as those foreseeing a coming
Chinese unipolar world5 or a world without superpowers at all. 6

NOAH FELDMAN, COOL WAR: THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION, xi (2013).
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1. NOAH FELDMAN, COOL WAR: THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION (2013).

2. The depiction on the cover appears popular among books analyzing modem U.S.-China
relations. See, e.g., AARON L. FRIEDBERG, A CONTEST FOR SUPREMACY: CHINA, AMERICA, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY IN ASIA (2011); JAMES STEINBERG & MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, STRATEGIC
REASSURANCE AND RESOLVE: U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014).
3. See JAMES R. GORRIE, THE CHINA CRISIS: How CHINA'S ECONOMIC COLLAPSE WILL LEAD TO
A GLOBAL DEPRESSION (2013); GORDON G. CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001).
4. See G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS, CRISIS, AND TRANSFORMATION
OF THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER (2012).
5. See MARTIN JACQUES, WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD: THE END OF THE WESTERN WORLD
AND THE BIRTH OF A NEW GLOBAL ORDER (2d. ed. 2012).

6. See Barry Buzan, A World Order Without Superpowers: Decentred Globalism, 25 INT'L REL.
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In presenting his vision and prescriptions for the future, Feldman organizes the
book into three sections: "Cool War," 7 "The Sources of Chinese Conduct," 8 and
"Global Competition."9 The first two seek to outline the situation between the
United States and China and provide a glimpse of the machinery of Chinese
leadership and motivations. The third section then uses the information presented
in earlier sections to construct various predictions for how the Cool War will play
out and recommendations for both sides on how to manage the coming
confrontation.
Feldman professes his purpose as being to provide a clear and realistic view of
present and future U.S.-China relations as well as ideas for the mitigation of
confrontation.10 While Cool War makes some interesting and provocative points,
its analysis and recommendations appear aimed more at fighting the predicted Cool
War than mitigating it. The work is therefore contradictory as to one of its stated
purposes. Feldman also remains tightly focused on comparing the present day to the
Cold War and his evaluations present these eras as becoming fundamentally
identical but for some nuances as to the influences keeping the sides from open and
more destructive conflict. Just as the United States and U.S.S.R. had to skirt around
military encounters and nuclear weapons in their confrontation, the United States
and China must do the same while also heeding their dense economic entanglement
and interdependence. Thus, rather than offering recommendations for conflict
management, Feldman presents the key factors that will influence present and future
U.S.-China relations and methods for each side to proceed to their advantage.
Furthermore, the work as a whole lacks necessary degrees of nuance and
extrapolation. It would have benefited greatly from additional length and
cohesiveness given its complicated and important target material. As a result, while
clearly crafted by a professor with enviable knowledge of government and
international affairs, readers are ultimately left with a book that takes a narrow and
somewhat disjointed look at the future of U.S.-China relations and pushes for
aggravating policy from both sides while claiming to advance the opposite. While
Cool War is still an interesting and unique read due to its pragmatic combination of
political theory and cross-Pacific analysis, it is unlikely to be a defining work on the
coming era of international politics or U.S.-China relations.

II. COOL WAR
Feldman begins by presenting how unique the U.S.-China relationship is in
history and exactly what the Cool War entails. From there he moves on to showing
3 (2011); CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, No ONE'S WORLD: THE WEST, THE RISING REST, AND THE COMING
GLOBAL TURN (2013).
7. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 3-51.

8. Id.at 55-98.
9. Id. at 101-66.
10. Id. at xiv ("Reducing the grave dangers of global conflict would serve the United States but
also China and the world more generally. The purpose of this book is to start figuring out how we can
do so, before it is too late.").
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the powerful reasons for the United States and China to engage in both collaboration
and confrontation. While it lacks some relevant detail, this section provides a good
general impression of the motivations for each actor to pursue both courses of action.
Generally, the phrase "Cool War" captures a situation between countries that
Such a
entails strong competing incentives for cooperation and conflict.
circumstance naturally brings to mind the Cold War, and Feldman begins his book
by comparing modem times to this great standoff' '-a theme he continues
throughout the book. As outlined by Feldman, the Cool War appears to be Cold
War-light: a clash of powerful competing states, but one with additional factors
militating towards cooperation.
The situation between the United States and China has, as Cool War
acknowledges, important differences from that between the United States and
U.S.S.R. The Cold War foes engaged in little cooperation but for their talks,
negotiations, and private maneuvers aimed at averting cataclysmic direct conflict. 12
Feldman asserts that a main reason for this lack of collaboration was the relative
absence of trade between these states.' 3 This stands in stark contrast to the deep
economic entanglement that characterizes U.S.-China relations. 4 China owns
approximately $1.3 trillion in U.S. debt' 5 while the United States is China's largest
trading partner with approximately $560 billion in bilateral trade in 2013.16 Where
the United States and U.S.S.R. existed in almost completely separate economic
systems, the United States and China inhabit the same one and, moreover, engage
with one another to a phenomenal degree within it.
Whereas direct conflict was unsound during the Cold War because of the
mutually assured destruction ("MAD") made possible by nuclear weapons, the
United States and China would additionally face "mutually assured economic
destruction" ("MAED") were they to engage in conflict.' 7 MAD necessarily
11. The first sentence of the book asks "[a]re we on the brink of a new Cold War?" Id. at xi.
12. See, e.g., ROGER E. KANET & EDWARD A. KOLODZIEJ, THE COLD WAR AS COOPERATION:
SUPERPOWER COOPERATION IN REGIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (1991) (analyzing Cold War

cooperation between the United States and U.S.S.R. and finding that such interaction was almost entirely
aimed at averting direct physical confrontation).
13. FELDMAN, supra note 1,at 7.
14. Id.
15. Max Fisher, This Surprising ChartShows Which Countries Own the Most U.S. Debt, WASH.
POST (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/10/10/thissurprising-chart-shows-which-countries-own-the-most-u-s-debt/ (presenting an interactive chart showing
which countries currently own U.S. debt and how much). This situation brings to mind the famous quote
from the great American industrialist, John Paul Getty, "[i]f you owe the bank $100 that's your problem.
If you owe the bank $100 million, that's the bank's problem." J. Paul Getty Quotes, BRAINY QUOTE,
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/j/jpaulgett 129274.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
16. Trade in Goods with China, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/balance/c5700.html#2013 (last updated Apr. 2, 2015). See also Top 10 Trading Partners of the
AM),
8:21
2014,
(Feb.
19,
DAILY
CHINA
Mainland,
Chinese
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2014-02/19/content_17290565.htm (putting the figure for
U.S./China trade in 2013 at approximately $520 billion, but still listing the U.S. as China's largest trading
partner).
17. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 12.
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encompasses MAED, but MAED does not necessarily encompass MAD. While
MAD still exists today as a disincentive to conflict, MAED is a relatively new beast,
and Feldman argues that this supplementary risk makes both conventional and
economic warfare irrational for both actors and provides a strong inducement for
cooperation. 8 History is replete with destructive confrontation between established
and rising powers, but "never before has the dominant world power been so
economically interdependent with the rising challenger it must confront."'19 The
numbers speak for themselves in terms of the debt and trade at stake, and this
situation provides a powerful motivation to avoid confrontation.
Feldman's analysis of the forces for cooperation in the U.S.-China relationship
is well articulated and commonsensical. It does, however, miss a key aspect of
economic entanglement that may contradict his assertion that it is a purely
cooperative factor. As noted above, economic entanglement creates a situation
unique to the Cool War. Given the lack of economic connection between the United
States and U.S.S.R. during the twentieth century, both could feel free to engage in
economic actions against one another.2" Yet this lack of connection also meant that
both were more limited in terms of these actions than if they had engaged in robust
trade. Conversely, the abundance of economic interaction between the United States
and China means both are invested in the economic success of the other and are
disinclined to act negatively in this manner.2' Nevertheless, were they motivated to
harm the other, their interconnectedness offers more of a chance to do so should their
calculus determine that the benefits outweigh the costs, and states may be more
willing to push the envelope when it comes to economic action as opposed to that
a punishing
involving kinetic weaponry.2 2 These sorts of maneuvers can have
23
impact while sparing risk in terms of intensification and violence.

18. Id. at 8-13.
19. Id. at 15.
20. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 6 (3d ed. 2007)

(concluding U.S. sanctions against the U.S.S.R. were not especially effective nor material in bringing
about the latter's collapse). See also James Gibney, Sanction Russia? Reagan Tried it With no Luck,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2014, 8:52 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-03-17/sanction-

russia-we-ve-tried-this-before (presenting a specific example of the ineffectiveness of U.S. economic
action against the Soviet Union).
21.

FELDMAN, supra note 1,at 8.

22. Examples of this are the United States' sanctions regimes against both Russia and Iran. These
measures were undertaken in place of physical responses to Iran's nuclear program and Russia's
intervention in Ukraine. See, e.g., Rick Noack, Will Sanctions Work Against Russia? lran'sExperience
Offers

a

Few

Clues,

WASH.

POST

(July

31,

2014),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/07/3 I/will-sanctions-work-against-russiairans-experience-offers-a-few-clues/.
West

23. See Leah McGrath Goodman & Lynnley Browning, The Art of Financial Warfare: How the
(April
24, 2014, 6:06
AM),
is Pushing Putin's Buttons, NEWSWEEK

http://www.newsweek.com/2014/05/02/art-financial-warfare-how-west-pushing-putins-buttons248424.html (outlining the crimpling effect economic attacks can have on enemies while avoiding the
"unwanted collateral damage" and risk that goes along with soldiers, guns, and bombs).
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A recent example of this is the United States' economic action against Russia
for its intervention in Ukraine's province of Crimea.24 The strategy of economic
rather than direct military engagement is meant to coerce Russia into abandoning its
expansionist aims while avoiding, among other things, physical confrontation, more
substantial diplomatic damage, and intense retaliation.25 The United States and
China's economic entanglement therefore provides a further chilling effect on
expansive conflict on top of that provided by MAD, but also increases the likelihood
of direct harmful measures being undertaken short of a physical clash. This situation
makes the sources of cooperation put forth in Cool War slightly less black and white.
Yet even with these incentives to avoid conflict, Feldman laments, "[i]f only
the world were so simple."26 Standing in the way of cooperation are numerous
factors pushing toward confrontation. 27 First among these in Feldman's mind are
the forces of political realism. 8 This theory generally holds that international
society is inhabited by states existing in anarchy with no guarantees of security.2 9
This situation requires them to engage in constant competition and conflict in pursuit
of their own national interests and power since they are30 the only guarantors of their
own safety in an unpredictable and ungoverned world.
China's overall rise coupled with the United States' relative economic decline,
Feldman argues, changes the international balance of power. 3' China's desire for
security in a tough neighborhood will lead it to seek to take advantage of this
transformation.32 Furthermore, beyond security, both the United States and China
24. These actions have included a litany of economic sanctions against key Russian individuals and
businesses. See Ukraine-Related Designations. 3/20/2014, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY (Mar. 20,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC2014),
Enforcement/pages/20140320 33.aspx. See also Ukraine-RelatedDesignations:4/28/2014, U.S. DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Pages/20140428.aspx.
25. See Peter Feaver & Eric Lorber, The Problem with Obama'sStrategy of GraduatedEscalation
Towards

Russia,

FOREIGN

POLICY

(Mar.

25,

2014,

4:16

PM),

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/20 14/03/25/problemobama-strategy-graduated-escalation-tow
ards russia (arguing economic rather than military action by the United States limits the extent of the
conflict while allowing it to take initiative and put pressure on Russia).
26. FELDMAN, supranote I, at 15.
27. It must be noted that every state engages in competition-to some degree-with every other
state. Thus, "[c]ompetition is inevitable in the U.S.-China relationship, just as it is in any relationship
among states .... The United States competes and occasionally has serious disagreements with even its
closest allies." STEINBERG & O'HANLON, supra note 2, at 4. What are important are the reasons and
degrees to which competition between the United States and China escalates beyond this normal
interaction.
28. Feldman, supranote 1,at 17-19.
29. See, e.g., Political Realism in InternationalRelations, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.,

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/ (last updated Apr. 2, 2013) (defining political
realism in international relations as "a view of international politics that stresses its competitive and
conflictual side" where "states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own
national interests, and struggle for power" on "a sphere without justice").
30. See id.
31. FELDMAN, supranote 1,at 19.
32. See, e.g., ANDREW J. NATHAN & ANDREW SCOBELL, CHINA'S SEARCH FOR SECURITY (2012)
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have interests in remaining the sole superpower and challenging that role,
respectively. Feldman claims these "reasons are both psychological and material"
in terms of perceptions of strength providing domestic and international support and
respect as well as favorable trade and other more quantifiable benefits. 33 This
situation "gives China the means, opportunity, and motive to alter the global
34
arrangement in which the United States is the world's sole superpower."
According to realist doctrine, this is an opportunity that no state will pass up, and,
35
"[u]nder the circumstances, a shooting war is not unavoidable-but conflict is."
Pushing in the same direction as the forces of realism, Feldman continues, are
the influences of nationalism and ideology. 36 As China's power grows on the
international stage 37 the government and citizenry may demand more assertiveness
to go along with its stature. 38 Additionally, should China's economic growth slow
from the tremendous pace it has sustained over the last few decades, 39 the
Communist Party may resort to nationalism to maintain legitimacy. 40 In turn, "[a]s
the United States continues to struggle economically, we can expect increasing
nationalism from its citizens and the politicians who represent them" since this
"deflects attention away from the internal causes of problems and toward external
sources of trouble."'4' Both of these nationalisms will be focused on the other
respective state and will act as powerful variables driving toward conflict.
In general, the forces of political realism and nationalism appear safe bets to be
placed in the category of confrontational forces. Concerns for security and pride
will likely tend toward asserting oneself against a powerful other, and Feldman
presents these issues well. In terms of ideology, however, Feldman provides a less
than full picture of the situation. He contends there is a "one-sided war of ideas"
being pushed by the United States in which it submits China to ideological pressure
while China applies none in return. 42 Where China is presented in terms of
"ideological pragmatism," the United States is portrayed as more evangelist and
unable to accept China's lack of democracy, law, and human rights.43 What results
is an antagonistic relationship in which China seeks to conduct foreign policy

(putting forth, generally, that China's core interest is security since it resides in an unpredictable region
of the world filled with powerful actors while simultaneously dealing with areas of discontent within its
borders).
33. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 25-28.
34. Id. at 19.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 32-34.
37.

See, e.g., China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower, PEW RES. CTR. (July 13, 2011),

http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/07/13/china-seen-overtaking-us-as-global-superpower/ (analyzing data
showing that global opinion sides with China replacing the United States as the global superpower).
38. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 33.
39. Data: China, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/china (last visited Apr. 20,
2015).
40.
41.
42.
43.

FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 33.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 38-39.
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without reference to the internal structure or actions of other states while the United
States continuously pressures China to change and even challenges the Communist
Party's legitimacy.'
However, China's stance in favor of strict nonintervention in the internal affairs
of other states and favoring of stability and economic growth over human rights is
an ideology. 4 5 Furthermore, it is one that China presents to and encourages around
the globe through its actions on the United Nations Security Council,46 trade
policy,47 and general diplomacy 4 8 Just as the United States and western states push
for internal change within China on numerous fronts and for China to take tangential
issues into account when engaging in international trade,49 China pushes back that
44. Id.
45. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ideology (last visited
Apr. 20, 2015) (defining "ideology" as: "a: a systematic body of concepts especially about human life or
culture; b: a manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture c: the
integrated assertions, theories and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program"). See also Elizabeth C.
Economy, The Game Changer: Coping with China's Foreign Policy Revolution, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 142,
146 (2010) (putting forth that foreign countries are excited by what they see as "the China model," which
stands as an alternative to the models of the West); Sonya Sceats & Shaun Breslin, China and the
International Human Rights System, CHATHAM HOUSE 1, 42 (2012), available at
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Intemationa %2Law/r 101 2-sceatsbre
slin.pdf ("China's insistence that each state must define its own human rights priorities does not apply
only to itself. The key here is not what China does, but instead the idea that countries should 'nationalize'
supposedly universal values to fit their own experiences.").
46. See,
e.g.,
Security
Council-Veto
List,
UNITED
NATIONS,
http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto (last updated Apr. 20, 2015) (cataloguing veto use by
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and showing China's increased use of this mechanism
in the past decade). China also arguably has had a policy of abstaining from U.N. votes where pressuring
states to engage in certain actions is at issue. Christopher Holland, Chinese Attitudes to International
Law: China, the Security Council, Sovereignty, and Intervention, N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. ONLINE
FORUM 1, 10 (2012), available at http://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/l202/07/Christopher-HollandChina-the-Security-Council-and-lntervention.pd f.
47. How a government governs is of little concern for China in deciding to conduct trade with a
state. See Economy, supra note 45, at 146 ("The willingness of the Chinese government and its stateowned enterprises to do business anywhere, anytime, and at any price has become legendary."). See also
China's
Big
Investment,
PBS
NEWSHOUR
(July
5,
2005,
12:00
AM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia-july-dec05-china 7-05/ (quoting Sierra Leone's ambassador to
China saying: "They just come and do it. We don't start to hold meetings about environmental impact
assessments and human rights and bad governance and good governance.").
48. See
Principles
of
China's
Foreign
Policy,
ASIA
FOR
EDUCATORS,
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china 1950_forpol principles.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2015)
(explaining China's foreign policy decisions "derive from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each
other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.").
49. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG, AND MACAU): 2013 HUMAN

RIGHTS REPORT (2013), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220402.pdf
(providing the official U.S. view of human rights in China and stating that China's record in this regard
is severely negative); Tim Collard, Op-Ed., China-UK Human Rights Dialogue Builds Bridges to
Understanding,
S.
CHINA
MORNING
POST
(Apr.
22,
2014,
10:46
PM),
http://www.scmp.com/comment/article/149443 /china-uk-human-rights-dialogue-builds-bridgesunderstanding (asserting that western pressure on China over its internal affairs is a "well-understood part
of the bilateral relationship").
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these countries should not be concerned with the internal affairs of others.5" The
ideological conflict is therefore two-sided, with the United States' "responsible
sovereignty" on one side and China's "pure sovereignty" on the other. This situation
serves to make ideology an even more potent force pushing towards confrontation
than Feldman presents.
With the cooperative forces of MAD, MAED, and favorable debt and trade
figures pushing against the confrontational influences of realism, nationalism, and
ideology, Feldman outlines the interesting balancing act that the Cool War entails.
These are the general factors policy makers on both sides of the Pacific must be
aware of and navigate in managing relations going forward.
Sidelight on Taiwan
Beyond sources of cooperation and confrontation, Feldman offers what he
considers a likely scenario for how China may establish itself as a superpower. Key
to displaying and asserting this status, he puts forth, is Taiwan.5 Since the
Kuomintang fled to the island following the Chinese Civil War, China has had a
deep interest in its reabsorption.52 Feldman contends that this can be done while
simultaneously establishing China as a global superpower through a gradual military
buildup resulting in "a situation where the United States would not consider war as
a serious option."53 Essentially, China would ratchet up the cost of war in the eyes
of the United States to the point where it was no longer tenable.
This tactic, Feldman insists, has been used by China in the past, in the case of
Hong Kong. In that situation, British "Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher intended
to maintain some sort of British administration even after her country's ninety-nineyear 'lease' on Hong Kong expired in 1997.", 4 But "China's military capacity meant
the British could not seriously contemplate fighting China the way Britain had
fought (and defeated) Argentina." 55 Similarly, if China increased its military
capacity, promised the "one country, two systems" solution it applied to Hong Kong,
and the United States was able to save face with its allies and the world by claiming
"Taiwan was in a basic sense different from the rest of Asia," this, to Feldman, could
resolve the situation around the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan would accept reabsorption
and this would simultaneously "mean that China was on a par with the United States
50. See Christopher Bodeen, US Envoy Says Rights Talks With China Yield Little, YAHOO! (Apr.
28,2014,7:37 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/china-media-us-human-rights-pressure-fail-074704992.html
("As China is a sovereign nation, there is zero possibility of it allowing the U.S. to dictate its political
development.... We also are opposed to the United States using human rights as a pretext for interfering
in China's internal affairs."). See also Sceats & Breslin, supra note 45, at 45 ("China frequently invokes
the principle of non-interference or non-intervention to challenge the legitimacy of criticisms of its human
rights record or to register its objections to similar criticisms directed at its allies.").
51. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 20.
52. See, e.g., Michal Roberge & Youkyung Lee, China-TaiwanRelations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS,

http://www.cfr.org/china/china-taiwan-relations/p9223

(last

(outlining a concise history of the modem Chinese-Taiwanese relationship).
53. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 22.
54. Id. at 21.
55. ld.

updated

Aug.

11

2009)
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as a global superpower." 56 In establishing this hypothetical as plausible, Feldman
asks a simple question: "Would the president of the United States go to war with
China over Taiwan absent some high-profile, immediate crisis capable of mobilizing
domestic support?- 57 The costs of physical conflict would be too high, he concludes,
and, given the scenario58 above, the United States would likely accept Chinese
reabsorption of Taiwan.
The prediction above-or recommendation for China's Taiwan policy-is a
bold one. The situation across the Taiwan Strait is one of the most contentious in
the world, and, as such, has many layers. Feldman's analysis is interesting and offers
a highly plausible general scenario. He is convincing in arguing that the
maintenance of America's place and security guarantees in Asia is key to any U.S.
acceptance of Taiwan's reabsorption into China. The United States would be highly
interested in ensuring that its Asian allies remained confident in its promises of
protection and that a costly and dangerous arms race did not develop. A problem
with Feldman's examination, however, is that he sees the state of affairs across the
Taiwan Strait as involving only two actors: the United States and China. 59 He
completely ignores the agency of Taiwan. In addition, there is an argument for
possible Chinese restraint in the face of U.S. absence and Feldman's likening of
Taiwan's possible reabsorption by China to Hong Kong's transition appears
problematic.
Feldman ventures that, "[a]fter the United States signaled its inability or
unwillingness to defend Taiwan, the people of Taiwan would, presumably, publicly
acquiesce in their own reabsorption into China's sovereign sphere." 60 But Taiwan
is not simply a pawn sitting between the United States and China. It has consistently
exercised its autonomy in pushing the situation in directions it wishes and forcing
the two larger powers to react. 61 Furthermore, it is-functionally, if not legally-its
own state, and significantly more Taiwanese support independence when forced to
choose between that and unification. 62 This support is influenced by the threat of
Id. 22-23.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 20-23.
Id.at 22.
Shelley Rigger, Taiwan in U.S.-China Relations, in TANGLED TITANS: THE UNITED STATES
AND CHINA, 293, 293 (David Shambaugh ed., 2013) ("Taiwan's capacity to deliver game-changing
initiatives keeps American and Chinese policy makers in a reactive mode much of the time."). An
example of this is the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-96. This was largely triggered by the actions of
then Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui and his influence in getting the U.S. Congress to override then
President Clinton's opposition to issuing him a visa to speak at Cornell University. China reacted
aggressively, the United States was forced to display its military commitment to Taiwan, and the two
larger powers engaged in a very tense exchange. See, e.g., Robert S. Ross, The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Confrontation, 25 INT'L SECURITY 87 (2000).
62. Chris Wang, Taiwanese Prefer Independence Over Unification: Survey, TAIPEI TIMES (Oct. 31,

2013), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/10/31/2003575806 ("[Tihe poll found that
most respondents favored independence over unification if they were asked to choose between just those
two options, with 71 percent supporting independence and only 18 percent supporting unification with
China.").
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Chinese retaliation against any such declaration, and even more would endorse
independence without such coercive influence.6 3 Segments of Taiwan's population
have also shown their willingness to engage in violent protest against strengthening
economic ties between the island and China. 64 In addition, China's recent limitations
on democracy in Hong Kong and resulting civil unrest, despite the "one country,
two systems" assurances it gave at the time of Hong Kong's reabsorption, have
probably increased resistance in Taiwan to closer relations with the mainland.65 It
is therefore not a given that Taiwan and its people would accept Chinese rule
peacefully if overtly coerced, whether this means militarily defending themselves or
the public reacting violently against their own government under a "one country,
two systems" arrangement or an installed government from the mainland.
There is also an argument to be made that China may exercise restraint in a
situation where it knows the United States will not provide security for Taiwan.
Much of China's discomfort and anxiety concerning the island comes from fears that
Taiwan will declare independence and the mainland will be forced to undertake
brash and damaging action-damaging to both others and itself.66 During calm
times, China has shown a willingness to allow its connection with Taiwan to develop
slowly and peacefully.67 Should the United States remove itself from the equation,
63. See Yuan-Kang Wang, Taiwan Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Security Issues: Implications
for US Foreign Policy, 7 STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 93, 99-100 (2013) (citing the 2011 Taiwan National
Security Survey that found that "65.7 percent of respondents opposed independence if it would cause a
war with China. Without China's threat of war, however, independence enjoys widespread support among
Taiwan's public."). See also Emerson Niou, The China Factorin Taiwanese Politics, 63 J. Soc. ScI. 55,
61 (2011) ("[M]any people are attracted to the idea of Taiwan becoming an independent country but only
if China [will] not use force to stop that from happening."); Emerson M.S. Niou, A New Measure of
Preferences on the Independence-UnificationIssue in Taiwan, 40 J. ASIAN & AFRICAN STUD. 91 (2005)
(showing that a large percentage of Taiwanese would support Taiwan declaring independence if China is
guaranteed not to use force against it).
64. See, e.g., Austin Ramzy, Taiwan Stands Behind Use of Force Against Protesters,N.Y. TIMES
(March 24,2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/world/asia/taiwan-defends-use-of-force-againstprotesters.html?_r=-0 ("At least 174 people, including 119 police officers, were wounded" in violent
protests against "[t]he China trade bill").
65. See, e.g., Benny Avni, Be'ing's Crushingof Democracy in Hong Kong Sends Chills Through
Taiwan, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 20, 2014, 12:10 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/10/31/beijingscrushing-democracy-hong-kong-sends-chills-through-taiwan-278455.html
("[Tihe clash between
democracy defenders and guardians of Communist doctrine is reverberating in many of China's provinces
and is dimming its hope of peacefully annexing the independent island of Taiwan and uniting it with the
mainland.").
66. See Jia Qingguo & Alan D. Romberg, Taiwan and Tibet, in DEBATING CHINA: THE U.S.-CHUNA
RELATIONSHIP IN TEN CONVERSATIONS 176, 177-78 (Nina Hachigian ed., 2014) ("The Chinese
government believes that the best way to resolve the Taiwan problem is through peaceful dialogue,
consultation, and negotiation. However, it has repeatedly announced that it is ready to fight a war to
defend China's territorial integrity if Taiwan moves toward independence.").
67. An example of this is China not objecting to Taiwan's participation as an observer at the World
Health Assembly in 2009, the first time the latter was granted observer status at a U.N. body since it lost
its seat at the United Nations to China in 1971. Roberge & Lee, supra note 52, at Significance of the
Rapprochement. Another example is the early 2014 cross-strait diplomatic encounter between China and
Taiwan, the first since 1949. Michael Pizzi, What's Next for China-Taiwan Relations?, AL JAZEERA
(Feb.
15, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/15/what-s-next-for-
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the risks of unilateral independence to Taiwan and China would move in opposite
directions, significantly increasing for the former and decreasing for the latter.
China would therefore face much more freedom of action and may not necessarily
engage in explicit coercion. It would have the peace-of-mind to let things develop
in a more or less mutually pleasing and peaceful fashion. China also likely has little
desire to absorb a restless territory-to go along with Tibet and Xinjiang-when it
could have an appeased one. In addition, peaceful transition would help China's
image in the region, which has taken a hit as a result of its forceful rhetoric and
actions in the South China Sea and island dispute with Japan.68 Taiwan would not
necessarily have to simply "acquiesce" to Chinese reabsorption, but could engage in
meaningful negotiations and population pleasing actions to make the process as
seamless as possible.
Finally, Feldman's likening of the situation across the Taiwan Strait to that of
Hong Kong's reabsorption is puzzling. These two circumstances are quite different.
Hong Kong was firmly under the rule of a recognized and influential world power:
the United Kingdom.69 There was also an agreement between China and the United
Kingdom setting a date for the resumption of Chinese sovereignty.70 The United
Kingdom was therefore naturally far less inclined to fight for continuing control over
Hong Kong than for the Falkland Islands, which were permanently claimed against
the competing claims of Argentina.7' While then Prime Minister Thatcher may have
entertained notions of maintaining British dominion over Hong Kong, the
appeasements offered by China were more likely meant to streamline the region's
peaceful reintegration rather than avoid a war with the United Kingdom.
Taiwan, on the other hand, has existed in opposition to China and the
Communist Party since the Chinese Civil War. The Kuomintang fled their defeat at
the hands of Mao Zedong and the communists and continued the international entity
of the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan.72 Unlike the United Kingdom,
which had sovereign control over Hong Kong, the United States makes no claim of
ownership over Taiwan. The United States does not even maintain an explicit
security guarantee for the island.73 Rather, it conducts itself under the foreign policy

chinataiwanrelations.html.
68. See, e.g., Seth Robson, China's Aggressive Tactics Turning off Asian Neighbors, STARS &
STRIPES (June 25, 2013), http://www.stripes.com/china-s-aggressive-tactics-tuming-off-asian-neighbors1.226581 ("[A] series of clashes over territorial disputes and Beijing's tendency to economically punish
those who get in its way have encouraged many Asian nations to reassess their choices-an increasingly
aggressive Chinese dragon or a more distant and relatively benign America.").
69. See Hong Kong Profile, BBC (Dec. 3, 2014,), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific16526765.
70. See id.
BBC,
War,
Falklands
The
Facts:
Key
71. See
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457033/html/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
72. See Roberge & Lee, supra note 52.

73. See, e.g.,

DEAN P. CHEN, US TAIWAN STRAIT POLICY: THE ORIGINS OF STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY

(2012) (analyzing the origins of the U.S.'s stance of "strategic ambiguity" toward Taiwan, under which
it does not make explicit its commitment to defend the island nor state that it will not do so in the event
of Chinese aggression).
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doctrine of "strategic ambiguity" whereby it maintains that it "does not endorse
unification or independence; instead, it emphasizes that whatever relationship
develops in the Strait, it must come about through a peaceful process. '74 Such a
stance creates the possibility that the United States will militarily ensure Taiwan's
security without explicitly establishing this. Furthermore, there is no agreement in
place for the peaceful reabsorption of Taiwan into China. Hong Kong is a region
that alternately belonged to different recognized states by international agreement
with an established transfer mechanism. Taiwan, by contrast, is a separate and selfgoverning entity that belongs to no framework for Chinese reabsorption, and was in
fact founded on hostility to the mainland. The two situations are starkly different
and Feldman's likening of them appears inaccurate and unconvincing.
It is still conceivable, however, that the Taiwan scenario presented by Cool War
could occur, but this is because it is simple and underdeveloped. It is true that the
display and threat of U.S. force has been a dominant factor in maintaining the
separation of Taiwan and China." Under current national trajectories-the rise of
China and the relative decline of the United States-the day may very well come
when the United States no longer finds it advantageous to continue this stance. The
subtraction of U.S. military might from the equation would fundamentally alter the
situation and could result in, as Feldman predicts, Taiwan publicly acquiescing to
Chinese reabsorption. But it could also result in, among other things, continued
separation, more substantial negotiation, protest, or violence-public or military.
Feldman offers no argument for his prediction of acquiescence to reabsorption due76
to military pressure other than "because China can" and "Taiwan would have to."
As noted above, there are numerous factors that make such a rudimentary argument
unconvincing.
III.

THE SOURCES OF CHINESE CONDUCT

The second main section of Cool War attempts to provide a glimpse into the
inner workings of the Chinese government. The title of this part of the book leads
one to believe that Feldman intends to explain the sources of Chinese foreign policy.
Feldman also hints at this by stating that "[i]t is not possible to understand the
dynamics of a cool war unless we have a more sophisticated understanding of the
Chinese Communist Party." 77 The section, however, actually does nothing of the
sort. Rather, it is best understood as an argument for the rationality and likely
longevity of the Chinese system. There are faint mentions of broad foreign policy
motivations, but these are not expounded upon.78

74. Rigger, supra note 61, at 305.

75. Such actions were key in diffusing each of the Taiwan Strait Crises in 1954-55, 1958, and 1996See Taiwan Strait Timeline, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUDIES,
97, respectively.
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/programs/taiwan/timeline/pt4.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
76. FELDMAN, supra note 1,at 22.
77. ld.at xiii.
78. Id.at 98 ("The Chinese leadership is highly rational and self-interested. Its interests are tied to
continued economic growth").
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Feldman begins the section with a lengthy exposition of the events concerning
the fall of former prominent Chinese official Bo Xilai, who was undone by both his
own corruption and that of his wife. 79 Feldman asserts that this situation can be
interpreted in one of two ways. First, it can be read as a confirmation of the popular
view that the Chinese leadership is corrupt, immune from the law, and made up of
hereditary elite known as "princelings." 80 Alternatively, it can be seen as showing
China creating a durable and legitimate governing structure able to handle these sorts
of destabilizing events. 8' Feldman takes the latter view. He emphasizes that the
Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") has developed "[a] mixed or permeable elite;
regular transitions; accountable government; and the emerging, if incomplete, battle
against corruption." 82 Together, it is argued, "[these] represent an attempt to create
a durable and legitimate governing structure."83
In terms of China's mixed/permeable elite, Cool War stresses that "[t]he
leadership of the Communist Party is made up of meritocrats and princelings. And
despite their head start over pure meritocrats, those princelings must still display
merit to advance."84 This allows all candidates "a realistic chance to enter the elite"
and avoids a higher risk of conflict and "a classic revolutionary situation" where an
85
The
insulated hereditary elite excludes talented individuals from power.
advantages of both family and merit systems are realized as the benefits of being a
princeling and exist without eliminating the potential for skilled but unconnected
individuals to succeed. 86 Chinese leadership also allows for the development of
factions within the CCP, further fashioning a more mixed government.87 Examples
of this are the divides between the princelings and meritocrats and the left and
right.88
The Chinese government has also managed to put in place a reliable method of
power transition. Generally:
Power is being regularly shifted from one generation to the next. Each
cohort of senior Politburo members and Standing Committee members
that is selected comes from a particular age cohort of around ten years.
89
No matter how talented you are, you must wait your tum.
This rotation serves the same general function that elections do in democratic
societies. It incentivizes elites to respect current leaders when they are out of power
79. Bo Xilai Scandal: Timeline, BBC (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asiachina-17673505 (providing a timeline on Bo Xilai's fall from power). See also Profile: Bo Xilai, BBC
(Sep. 22, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china- 19709555 (providing a profile on Bo Xilai).
80. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 65.
81. Id. at 65-70.
82. Id. at 69.
83. Id. at 70.
84. Id. at 66.
85. Id. at 77.
86. Id. at 76.
87. ld. at 80-82.
88. In China, the left are conservatives who seek to conserve some form of traditional communism
and the right are those who wish to move more in the direction of markets. Id. at 81.
89. Id. at 83.
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because they can expect to attain it in the future.9" Similarly, elites rule with the
expectation of eventually losing power. 91 Solving the problem of power transition
is an important factor in a government's stability, and China's method "has shown
' 92
that it can operate predictably and effectively."
Though the CCP has not gone so far as to make itself publicly accountable
through elections, limited avenues of government accountability have developed.
The Party engages in a great deal of censorship but does allow what Feldman calls
"selective free speech. ' 93 This entails the government allowing the public to be more
expressive on certain topics than others. 94 The benefits of this strategy include: the
providing of information and public opinion to the CCP; the venting of frustrations
by the public that may otherwise express themselves more harmfully; and the
focusing of the public on the speech it is able to conduct rather than that which is
censored.95 In terms of accountability, the limited expression of public opinion is
the most important factor. Feldman holds that "[t]he party must attend to public
opinion so seriously because it knows that it cannot survive as the ruling party
without preserving its legitimacy." 96 Limited free speech serves this function
opinion without waiting for
because "[t]he trick is to find ways to ascertain public
97
serious objections to the system to grow or develop.
In order to further cement its legitimacy and longevity, the CCP has also
undertaken its own unique method to combat corruption. Rather than establishing
the rule of law, like in the West, China "operates a Central Discipline Inspection
Commission, and periodically runs anticorruption campaigns in which thousands of
members are investigated and punished." 98 In addition, when party members are
shown to be corrupt, they are visibly purged. 99 This is all meant to keep corruption
from escalating to truly damaging levels and to convince the public the government
cares about stopping it.'0o
Taken together, Feldman's points provide an argument for the durability of the
CCP and an interesting cursory introspection into factors that maintain a
government's rule-a mixed/permeable elite, peaceful transitions, accountability,
and fighting corruption. It does not, however, accomplish what the title of the
section implies: namely, provide explanation for the sources of Chinese conduct.
The four factors noted above provide little insight into how China would handle a
given Cool War situation. If Taiwanese leadership were to once again move toward
independence, knowledge of the Chinese government's permeability, transitions,

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 82.
Id.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id. at95.
Id.
Id.at 94-95.
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accountability, or corruption provides, at best, modest insight into the regime's
mechanisms for formulating a response or what that might be. Similarly, these
factors contribute relatively little to understanding how China might handle the
United States and western states suddenly using the World Trade Organization
("WTO") as a forum for human rights issues.' 0'
This portion of the book therefore feels incongruous with the rest. Cool War,
overall, professes to present the coming age of international relations, U.S.-China
relations, and their dynamic. 0 2 A section on Chinese government structure, foreign
policy formulation, and the domestic actors principally involved in this would have
been highly useful to include.
Cool War, therefore, does not deliver a
comprehensive work on the Cool War. Readers are left to turn elsewhere for
information on and analysis of China's leadership and foreign policy complex that
03
will actually engage in this enterprise.'
Yet this section does make a different contribution to Feldman's overall
argument, though not as important as a section on Chinese foreign policy
formulation would have provided. There exists a substantial body of literature
arguing that the CCP will face important impediments in the near future and
seriously questioning its possible longevity and potential."~ Such arguments
fundamentally contradict Feldman's prediction of a Cool War developing between
the United States and China-one staunchly democratic and the other single party
authoritarian. If the CCP were to crumble or institute democracy, these core
differences-or at least their importance-would evaporate and a Cool War would
be difficult to put forth. Feldman is showing that the Chinese government, more or
less as it exists today, has developed innovative measures addressing its weaknesses
and will be around for some time. Though likely unworthy of the large amount of
space allocated to it in the book, this argument is important for establishing the
importance and likelihood of Feldman's core assertions.

101. See infra pp. 117-18.
102. FELDMAN, supra note 1,atxi-xiv.
103. There are a number of works on these subjects. POLITICS IN CHINA: AN INTRODUCTION
(William A. Joseph ed., 2nd ed. 2014); RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF
CHINA'S COMMUNIST RULERS (2010); SUSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER (2007). See also
DEBATING CHINA: THE U.S.-CHINA RELATIONSHIP IN TEN CONVERSATIONS (Nina Hachigian ed. 2014)

(presenting the major foreign policy issues between the U.S. and China in the form often conversations
between different American and Chinese specialists).
104. See, e.g., G. John lkenbeiny, The Rise of China,the UnitedStates, and the Futureof the Liberal
InternationalOrder, in TANGLED TITANS: THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, 53, 68 (David Shambaugh

ed.,
2013) ("There islittle evidence that authoritarian states can become truly advanced societies without
moving in a liberal democratic direction."). See also GIDEON RACHMAN, ZERO-SUM FUTURE: AMERICAN

POWER IN AN AGE OF ANXIETY 283 (2011) (quoting Kishmore Mahbubani as stating, "China cannot
succeed in its goal of becoming a modem developed society until it can take the leap and allow the
Chinese people to choose their own rulers.").
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IV. GLOBAL COMPETITION
The previous sections have outlined the cooperative yet conflictive nature of
the Cool War, the sources of these influences, and the War's likely longevity given
the stability of the Chinese regime. So, what will be the battlefields of the Cool War
and how will the global competition between the United States and China be carried
out? In the final portion of his book, Feldman presents what he thinks will be the
core areas of contention between these great powers. But the absence of key and
obvious points of conflict and a clear focus on prescription rather than explanation
show that Feldman is actually most concerned with providing recommendations for
how each side can non-violently fight the Cool War. In addition, though stated as a
main purpose of this work, °5 little is ultimately offered in terms of suggestions for
06
how the sides can keep their heated competition from escalating.'
First and foremost, as with the Cold War, the Cool War will involve a "race for
allies."'0 7 Just as the United States and U.S.S.R. utilized carrots and sticks to load
their respective blocs with members in an effort to legitimize and bolster themselves
while isolating the other, U.S.-China relations will feature a similar dynamic.
Principally, in the near-term, this interplay will take place in the Pacific, where China
does not wish to be contained 0 8 and the United States seeks to maintain its valuable
economic and strategic positions.0 9 Moving forward, Feldman recommends that
China ally itself with those states considered "bad actors" by the West. " 0 In this
regard, it possesses an advantage over the United States in its attractiveness to these
states with its authoritarian government and non-interventionist ideology. "' On the
other side, Feldman holds that the United States should develop a "democratic
league" to counter China's rise and pressure it to westernize. 2 Cool War alliances
will, however, be unique in that "security alliances with one side can be reconciled
with economic relationships to the other: indeed, that is the central characteristic of
cool war.""'13

Along with alliances, Feldman asserts that international law and institutions
will take on increasing importance in the Cool War. "4 Since physical confrontation
FELDMAN, supra note 1, at xiv.
106. The only true calming recommendations come at the very end of the book where Feldman offers
three ideas for how the Cool War can be managed short of physical conflict. These recommendations,
however, are incredibly vague and more or less simply things to keep in mind when developing one's
own ideas for managing the competition. Id. at 163-64.
107. Id. at 101.
108. Id. at 104. See also James B. Steinberg, Conclusion, in DEBATING CHINA: THE U.S.-CHINA
105.

RELATIONSHIP IN TEN CONVERSATIONS 221,

223 (Nina Hachigian ed., 2014) ("Several Chinese

[experts].. attribute much of the difficulty [in U.S.-China relations] to the perception in China that the
United States is pursuing a policy of containment.").
109. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 104.
110. ld.at108-10.
11. See id. at 108 ("In essence, an invitation to allegiance with China functions as a kind of blank
check on domestic affairs.").
112. Id. at 110-16.
113. Id. at 143.
114. Id. at 119.
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is largely untenable, these mechanisms and forums will be the principal points of
contact and conflict between the United States and China." 5 Feldman claims that
"[t]he irrelevance of the UN Security Council is coming to an end.""' While the
117
contention that the Security Council has become irrelevant is highly debatable,
the body has begun to taken on somewhat of the role it did during the Cold War
when the United States and U.S.S.R. used it as a primary platform to engage one
another and jostle for position."" The debates and decisions of the Council in
reference to the continuing Syrian Civil War are an example of this."" While the
United States and the West push for respect for human rights and government
accountability, China-joined by Russia-advocates respect for state
sovereignty. 120
Beyond the Security Council, Feldman predicts the WTO will also be a key
venue in the Cool War.' 21 It is a powerful organization "devoted to facilitating
22
international trade" and resolving disputes whose judgments are largely obeyed.
Member states may bring claims before the WTO and, if they win, may penalize the
member states that have wronged them. 2 3 Members are incentivized to cooperate
with WTO regulations and rulings in order to avoid punishments and gain the
benefits of membership. Both the United States and China have largely bought into
the system 2 4 and its importance in resolving conflict between these two
economically entangled powers will only grow.
Feldman builds on the conflict-management capabilities of the WTO to also
advocate its use by the United States as a tool to compete with China. He begins by
noting that "[s]o long as China continues to violate human rights, there may be no
better ideological tool for the United States to gain advantage." 125 The United States
115. ld. at 128-29.
116. Id.at119.
117. There are many who disagree with Feldman's provocative contention that the U.N. Security
Council has been irrelevant in recent times. See DAVID Bosco, FIVE To RULE THEM ALL: THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 4 (2009); Jessica Rettig, Why the UN.

Security Council is Still Important, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Oct. 9, 2009, 12:40 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2009/ 10/09/why-the-un-security-council-is-still-imponrtant;
Martin Sieff, Why the UN Security Council Still Matters, GLOBALIST (Sep. 25, 2013),
http://www.theglobalist.com/un-security-council-still-matters/.
118. FELDMAN, supranote 1,at 121.
119. See Factbox: U.N. Security Council Action on the Syrian Conflict, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/22/us-syria-crisis-un-resolutions11:59
AM),
idUSBREAILORU20140222 (presenting the extensive deliberations and actions of the U.N. Security
Council in response to the Syrian Civil War).
120. Security Council-Veto List, supra note 46. See also CNN Staff, Russia, China Block Syria
8:10 AM),
2014,
(May 23,
From Facing International Criminal Court, CNN
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/22/world/syria-un/ ("Throughout the conflict inSyria, Russia and Chinaboth permanent council members-have repeatedly used their veto power to block resolutions tough on
the Syrian regime.").
121. FELDMAN, supranote l,at 121.
122. Id. at 122.
123. Id. at 122-23.
124. Id. at 123-24.
125. Id. at 149.
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"has always used the ideology of human rights as a political tool, deployed when
convenient and ignored otherwise."' 126 The key, however, is linking human rights to
economic interests.127 The WTO, Feldman contends, could be the mechanism for
this. 12' The strategy would involve the United States and other western states
bringing "trade-linked human rights claims before WTO tribunals." 29 An example
Feldman presents is claiming that slave labor or inhuman labor conditions or wages
act as an unfair subsidy for a state's products. 30 Ultimately, the success of such an
endeavor depends on whether China simply leaves the WTO in response or chooses
to stay and fight the challenges within the legal framework. 3'
The argument for using the WTO as a forum for human rights has been made
before,' 32 and it remains unconvincing as put forth in Cool War. While Feldman's
strategic reasoning appears quite novel, it suffers from potential, and severe, risks.
There is a strong case to be made that the WTO functions so well because
contentious issues like human rights are not considered under its purview. Member
states know that their internal affairs will largely remain off the table and only issues
concerning international trade will be addressed. The WTO is therefore considered
an apolitical entity.133 Introducing such a highly politicized issue as human rights
risks degrading the entire system. The WTO may become seen as simply another
soapbox from which to engage in the same political grandstanding and standoffs as
so many other less effective international institutions. By bringing human rights to
the table, the United States and the West risk severely hampering, or outright
demolishing, an institution that offers them incredible benefit without achieving
anything. In this sense, Feldman's recommendation for the United States could
bring about more collateral damage than advantage.
Discussion of international trade does, however, lead to what may be the book's
most prescient subsection: Corporate Cool War. 134 Given the degree of economic
entanglement between the United States and China, businesses native to both sides
will find themselves drawn into the great power competition. Yet many of the
largest and most powerful Chinese companies are state-owned and therefore have
incredible advantages in terms of political and financial backing.' 35 This is doubly

126. Id. at 153.
127. Id. at 159.

128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 159-61.
Id.
at 161.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 160.

132. See, e.g., SARAH JOSEPH, BLAME IT ON THE WTO?: A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE (2013).

133. Many may assert that this is incorrect since large and wealthy nations are the main arbiters of
WTO law and policy and the ones who engage with it most often. But for the purposes of democracies
versus autocracies and human rights, this statement likely represents the views of most states.
134. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 131-46.
135. See USHA C.V. HALEY & GEORGE T. HALEY, SUBSIDIES TO CHINESE INDUSTRY: STATE
CAPITALISM, BUSINESS STRATEGY, AND TRADE POLICY (2013) (examining the extent of Chinese state

subsidies and strategies for state-owned enterprises and the substantial advantage they provide). See also
Doug Palmer, Rise of ChinaState-Owned FirmsRattles U.S. Companies, REUTERS (Aug. 17,2011, 12:09
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/17/us-usa-china-bigcompaniesPM),
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true when the arena of competition is the Chinese market. Feldman notes that "[i]t
is one thing to compete with another private firm. It is quite another to compete with
a firm that is deeply influenced by the forces that run the country where the market
is located."13 ' China's targeting of foreign corporations with cyber attacks shows
that this disadvantage goes beyond mere business competition.' 37 "Any firm that
finds itself on the opposite side of a serious Chinese competitor can now expect to
be subject to governmentally sanctioned warfare."' 38 Put simply, U.S. companies
"will not be allowed to defeat their Chinese competitors."' 39 This also leads to the
situation in which Chinese companies are able to take over U.S. and western
counterparts but the latter cannot do the same in return, and any "[b]ig acquisitions
are, in the cool war context, moves in a grand strategic game."' 14 ' This situation
leads Feldman to push for more U.S. government involvement with U.S. companies
in terms of support and defense since, "[i]n cool war China, economic competition
cannot be separated from political power."' 14 1 The Corporate Cool War is something
wholly novel with no counterpart from the Cold War. It will likely only escalate as
the U.S. government becomes more drawn in through China's aggressive support of
its firms, their expansion, and requests from U.S. companies.
The Corporate Cool War and Feldman's other positions on where U.S.-China
global competition will primarily take place are quite thought provoking, but one
cannot help but notice glaring absences, particularly with regard to areas of
competition that are much more likely to escalate. Some of these include the
mounting revelations of cyber conflict between the two states and China's
contentious territorial standoffs with U.S. allies.
Both the United States and China have powerful hacking units directed against
one another that carry out an incredible number of cyber incursions.' 42 Initially, this
sort of conduct was hidden and handled behind the scenes. 43 In recent years,
idUSTRE77G3Z320110817 ("Lower taxes, less regulation, protected home markets or privileged access
to domestic government procurement markets artificially improve the [state-owned enterprises']
'economies of scale, lowers their operating costs and increases their sales, enabling them to invest in new
technology that increase their competitive advantage at home and abroad.").
136. FELDMAN, supra note 1,at 134.
137. See Spencer Ackerman & Jonathan Kaiman, Chinese Military Officials Chargedwith Stealing
US
Data as
Tensions
Escalate, GUARDIAN
(May
20,
2014,
3:58
PM),

http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/19/us-chinese-military-officials-cyber-espionage
("The US Justice Department indicted five Chinese military officers with stealing data from six US
companies.").
138. FELDMAN, supra note 1,at 137.
139. ld. at 139.
140. Id. at 144.
141. Id. at 140.
142. Matthew M.Aid, Inside the NSA 's Ultra-Secret China Hacking Group, FOREIGN POLICY (June
10,
2013),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/10/inside the nsa s ultra secret china hacking group
;David E. Sanger et al., Chinese Army Unit is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hackingagainst-us.html?_r-2&.
143. See David E. Singer, U.S. Blames China'sMilitary Directlyfor Cyberattacks,N.Y. TIMES (May
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however, the two sides have openly accused one another of carrying out cyber
attacks.'" The United States has now officially indicted five named members of the
Chinese People's Liberation Army in connection with cyber attacks. Escalating
responses in this arena are worrying because the international legal and general
precedent for handling cyber attacks is non-existent. Can such actions justify armed
responses? If so, what degree of cyber attack is necessary? What other options are
open to an attacked state? With two actors as powerful as the United States and
China testing these waters, there is much to be concerned about under Cool War
conditions.
China's territorial claims against those of U.S. allies in East and Southeast Asia
are another area that should raise concern given the developing Cool War. China
claims islands in the East China Sea against Japan's assertions.145 China makes
similar claims in the South China Sea against those of, among others, the
Philippines.' 46 The United States is obligated through treaties to protect both of
47
these states, and has publicly announced its intent to do so should China go too far.'
With increasingly physical interactions between the disputing states, 14 these
situations are most definitely an area where U.S.-China relations will be tested.
The fact that the cyber and territorial disputes contaminating cross-Pacific
politics went unmentioned by Feldman show that he is less concerned with providing
an overview of the arenas of global competition between the United States and China
than recommending nonviolent tactics for each side to carry out. These tactics,
however, appear purely instigative since the collecting of allies, increased political
use of international institutions, politicization of the WTO, and intensification of the
Corporate Cool War are highly unlikely to help reduce tensions. These are very

2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/07/world/asia/us-accuses-chinas-military-in6
cyberattacks.html?pagewanted=all& r-0 ("Until now the administration avoided directly accusing both
the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army of using cyberweapons against the United
States ina deliberate, government-developed strategy.").
144. See id. (reporting on the U.S.'s open accusation against China of conducting cyberattacks
against it); Jacob Davidson, China Accuses U.S. of Hypocrisy on Cyberattacks, TIME (July 1, 2013),
("China's
top
http://world.time.com/20l3/07/0 I/china-accuses-u-s-of-hypocrisy-on-cyberattacks/
Internet security official stated that China possessed 'mountains of data' on American cyberattacks
against the People's Republic.").
145. Joseph Nye & Kevin Rudd, How to Navigate the East China Sea Dispute Between Japan and
China, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-navigate-theeast-china-sea-dispute-between-japan-and-china/2014/04/18/953731 a8-c67b- I1 e3-9f377ce307c56815 story.html.
146. Jane Perlez, Philippines and China in Dispute Over Reef, N.Y. TIMES (March 31, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01 /world/asia/beijing-and-manila-in-dispute-over-reef.html.
147. Mark Landler, On a Trip That Avoids Beijing, Obama Keeps His Eye on China, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/world/asia/on-a-trip-that-avoids-beijing-obamaseye-remains-on-china.html; Cris Larano, Obama Vows 'Ironclad' U.S. Defense of Philippines,WALL ST.
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J.,
(April
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2014,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702304163604579531562397334946.
148. Japan Reports Latest Incursion by Chinese Ships Around Senkakus, JAPAN TIMES (May 3 1,
2014),
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public and alienating actions where each side will have no choice but to stand against
the other in order to save face and protect core interests. Feldman makes an
interesting case for why the Cool War is here, and if his prescriptions are followed,
it will escalate faster.

V. CONCLUSION

In Aldous Huxley's 1962 novel, Island,the protagonist, Will Famaby, refers to
the Cold War as "Cold War L."'' I Cool War would have this statement come true as
Feldman grafts a Cold War dynamic on modem day international relations and
advances antagonistic courses of action for both the United States and China. While
there exist incentives for cooperation alongside those for competition, Feldman's
analysis relegates these to obstacles that the two states must steer around in going
after one another. For those who already hold this zero sum view and see the need
to immediately engage in Cool War combat through such tactics as a race for allies
and corporate war, this book is likely affirmative and perhaps builds on one's
parameters for analyzing the world. But for those who do not yet hold such a
prediction for the course of world politics, or who still see a place for basic dialogue
and diplomacy, this work is likely unconvincing. Cool War is still an interesting
read containing a unique and pragmatic, if somewhat disjointed, blend of general
political theory and U.S.-China analysis. But its impact on the debates and
scholarship revolving around the coming era of international politics and U.S.-China
relations will likely be limited.
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